Before the first shot
Grant did not expect Johnston to attack.
Grant intended to assemble his forces at Pittsburg Landing, not fight a major battle there. His divisions occupied a wooded plateau above the Tennessee River while Buell marched west from Nashville. Once united, the two armies would move on Corinth, twenty-two miles away, where the Memphis & Charleston and Mobile & Ohio railroads crossed. Capturing that junction would severely disrupt Confederate communications across the Mississippi Valley. 1
Because Grant expected to advance, he did not prepare his camps for a major attack. He did not believe Albert Sidney Johnston would leave Corinth’s defenses and strike first. The Federal camps had no continuous line of earthworks, and the divisions were arranged for convenience and a future advance rather than to support one another during a sudden assault. Pickets and patrols reported more contact in the woods, yet Grant still wrote on April 5 that the enemy’s main force remained at Corinth. The National Park Service concludes that the attack surprised him. Grant knew Confederate troops were nearby, but he misread their purpose. 2
South of the camps, Johnston’s army struggled to arrive before Union troops discovered it. The army left Corinth on April 3, then lost precious hours as long columns of infantry, guns, wagons, and horses jammed rain-soaked roads. Officers worried that the noise and delay had exposed the advance. But by the night of April 5, nearly 44,000 Confederates stood four miles from Pittsburg Landing. Union troops in the camps ahead expected a quiet Sunday of drill and another day of waiting. 1